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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

26 NOV 1975

The Vice President The White House Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Vice President:

I am sending you the enclosed advance copy of our estimate of developments in Soviet strategic programs through the mid-1980s in the hope that it will make a timely contribution to your consideration of SALT and national defense issues.

This year's estimate continues the practice initiated last year of combining Soviet offensive and defensive forces into a single document. In our current estimate we have been more explicit than before about the basis for our judgments and about our uncertainties. We have included alternative forecasts of Soviet strategic forces both with and without SALT TWO restrictions. We have also examined in some depth the prospects for significant Soviet technological advances in strategic weaponry. These changes have resulted in a three-volume document somewhat longer than NIE 11-3/8-74, but one which we believe conveys our estimates more precisely.

The Key Judgments of the estimate contain our findings in brief, but for a more complete explanation of our views I commend your attention to the remainder of Volume I and its charts.

Respectfully,

/s/, Bill

W. E. Colby

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25X1 Enclosure

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